Oddelek za filozofijo vabi na predavanje z naslovom »Filozofski pogled na sodobni terorizem«. Predaval bo prof. dr. Igor Primorac z Univerze v Melbournu (Avstralija).
Predavanje (v angleškem jeziku) bo v torek, 6. februarja 2007 ob 17. uri na Filozofski fakulteti, v predavalnici št. 2.40.
Profesor Primorac je eden najuglednejših strokovnjakov za pojmovna in moralna vprašanja, ki jih odpira sodobni terorizem. Je avtor številnih člankov na to temo in urednik imenitnega zbornika, ki je lani izšel tudi pri nas (Terorizem. Filozofska vprašanja, Ljubljana: Krtina.)
Igor Primorac je profesor filozofije na Hebrejski univerzi v Jeruzalemu, trenutno pa gostujoči profesor na Univerzi v Melbournu. Je avtor številnih člankov, objavljenih v prvovrstnih strokovnih publikacijah (tudi o definiciji in (ne)moralnosti terorizma), ter več knjig: Prestup i kazna (1980), Justifying Legal Punishment (1989, ponatis 1997, hrvaški prevod Kazna, pravda i opće dobro, Zagreb 1995), Etika in seks (1999, slovenski prevod Krtina 2002), Human Sexuality (uredil, 1997) in Patriotism (uredil, 2002).
Izvleček predavanja v angleškem jeziku:
A PHILOSOPHER LOOKS AT CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM
Igor Primorac
I first consider and reject the claim that the threat of terrorism we are facing in the aftermath of the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 is radically different from the kind of terrorism we had to contend with before. The true watershed in the history of terrorism was in the early twentieth century, when “direct” or “individual” terrorism was replaced by its “indirect” or “mass” variety.
Second, I offer a definition of (contemporary) terrorism meant to be helpful in discussions of its moral standing. If we are to avoid the pitfalls of relativism that hampers most public debate about terrorism, we need to put aside both the identities of the agents and their ultimate aims, and to focus on just what is done and what the proximate aim of doing it is. The definition I propose highlights violence against the innocent with the aim of intimidating and coercing some other person or group into doing things they otherwise would not to.
Third, I discuss the morality of terrorism, thus defined. I reject the consequentialist view of the morality of terrorism as a matter of its consequences, good and bad, and opt for an account of terrorism as wrong in itself, and very seriously wrong at that. Yet I resist the view that terrorism is absolutely wrong – wrong in all actual and conceivable circumstances. The correct position on the morality of terrorism is that terrorism is almost absolutely wrong.