Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor and Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

Program/Programme

MEDNARODNI SIMPOZIJ:
ŠTUDENTSKI FILOZOFSKI SIMPOZIJ 2022

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM:
PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS’ SYMPOSIUM 2022

Day 1 Classroom link
Day 2 Classroom link

MS Teams, 15.–16. November 2022

Oddelek za filozofijo, Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Mariboru in Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti (DAF)
Program/Programme

Torek/Tuesday
MS Teams (classroom link)

09:30 – 09:45  Pozdravni govori/Welcome speeches

09:45 – 10:15  Hedye Tayebi Jazayeri, University of Osnabrück: Debating Autonomy from a Feminist Perspective

10:15 – 10:45  Niko Šetar, University of Maribor: Conspiracy Thinking: A Lapse of Reason or a State of Mind?

10:45 – 11:00  Odmor/Coffee Break

11:00 – 11:30  Martin Dominik, Masaryk University: De re interpretation as arrogance: Understanding different sociolinguistic groups in accordance with intellectual humility

11:30 – 12:00  Aaron Maiwald, University of Osnabrück: Updating on Expert Majorities

12:00 – 13:00  Kosilo/Lunch break

13:00 – 13:30  Wouter Wiersma, University of Groningen: Hegel’s contradictory theory of freedom as a basis for Critical Theory

13:30 – 14:00  Ana Itzel López Romero, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: Non-Human Rights and Personhood in the Andes
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Presentation Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:30 – 10:00</td>
<td>Dušan Rebolj, University College London</td>
<td>Courage, norms, non-dominination: how courage can still make us free(er)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00 – 10:30</td>
<td>Mina Pavlović, University of Belgrade</td>
<td>Immanuel Kant’s Concept of Evil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30 – 10:45</td>
<td></td>
<td>Odmor/Coffee Break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:45 – 11:15</td>
<td>Anton Skretta, Northern Illinois University</td>
<td>Is Modal Personism a Mere Prejudice?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15 – 11:45</td>
<td>Martin Justin, University of Ljubljana</td>
<td>Environmental Ethics and the Identity Problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45 – 12:45</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kosilo/Lunch break</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:45 – 13:15</td>
<td>Aisha Qadoos, University of Birmingham</td>
<td>Non-volitional transformative experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Fribourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:45 –</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zaključek/Conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Povzetki/Abstracts

Ana Itzel López Romero, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Non-Human Rights and Personhood in the Andes

This paper addresses the puzzle that Human Rights as universal protections to personhood do not necessarily need to be human. In this paper I argue that an account of rights that protects personhood ought to be deeply relational and dependent on other normative agents, not on membership to the humankind. I expand on James Griffin’s theory of Human Rights by outlining a reciprocal relationship of duty-bearing and right-holding that is present in the moral person. My proposed relational theory of rights will be better at capturing and describing personhood as expressed in moral communities. To illustrate this, I analyze two case studies involving moral and legal relationships with non-human beings: The first, the granting of political rights to nature in Ecuador in 2008. The second, ethnographic fieldwork gathered in the Atacameño community in Northern Chile regarding the moral relationship of the community with a non-human being called La Pachamama. In this paper I show how these non-human beings belonging to their respective moral and legal communities should be under the universal protection to personhood and it is only through a relational understanding of personhood that we can accurately theorize about persons, rights, and duty.

Niko Šetar, University of Maribor

Conspiracy Thinking: a Lapse of Reason or a State of Mind?

Conspiracy thinking is a term denoting, simply enough, believing in veracity of conspiracy theories, the latter being assumptions that events and phenomena in the world are a consequence of deliberate and more often than not malevolent action of a particular powerful person or group of persons (Barkun, 2013). While general consensus is that conspiracy thinking is, at least in most cases, a type of intellectual vice, we still face the question of what type of vice it may be. Cassam (2019) categorises vices according to fidelity (i.e., how frequently a vice occurs in a person), placing conspiracy thinking into the low-fidelity category of “ways of thinking.” However, there are a number of approaches to explaining vice that claim that conspiracy thinking tends to reoccur in same persons, in the sense that someone who already believes in the veracity of conspiracy theory A is more likely to believe conspiracy theory B to be true as well. Furthermore, it may be argued that conspiracy thinking is not a vice in its own right, but rather a consequence of other intellectual vices.

While unlikely to provide a definitive solution, the aim of this contribution is to shed some light on this aspect of the nature of conspiracy thinking in order to assist further discussion about conspiracy thinking in context of intellectual and epistemic vice.
Martin Dominik, Masaryk University

De re interpretation as arrogance: Understanding different sociolinguistic groups in accordance with intellectual humility

The inferentialist de re interpretation sometimes lacks legitimacy and is intellectually arrogant. Game of giving and asking for reasons without limitations lays too much responsibility on the utterer. She cannot know inferences that do not exist in her sociolinguistic group. Therefore, she cannot be responsible for ignoring them, and they cannot constitute her commitments. Using de re interpretation may also amount to an intellectual arrogance. As an alternative, I suggest ascription of commitments in the language game limited by a relevant whole. This approach is more intellectually humble and it promotes understanding between groups with different perspectives.

Aaron Maiwald, University of Osnabrück

Updating on Expert Majorities

Bayesianism provides us with a formalism for how we should change (“update”) our subjective probability judgements (“credences”) in response to new evidence. Often this is applied to evidence in the form of direct observations of objective facts, e.g. “The coin landed heads”. However, there is another type of evidence: the probability judgements of others, e.g. “Q is 90% sure that the coin is fair”. How bayesians should respond to the second type of evidence is largely an open question. A major problem is that we do not know whether we have already seen the evidence that another person has updated on. I will be presenting some mathematical ideas for a theory of bayesian updating on others' credences when we suspect that we might share some evidence with them.

Wouter Wiersma, University of Groningen

Hegel's contradictory theory of freedom as a basis for Critical Theory

Kant’s idea that freedom is to be thought of in terms of self-legislation constitutes a revolution in thinking about morality. In the Hegelian tradition, Kant’s notion of freedom as self-legislation had been interpreted as running into a set of problems that have become known as the “paradoxes of autonomy”. In this presentation, I critically examine the view, defended by Brandom and Pippin, that Hegel’s practical philosophy can be read as a solution to the paradoxes of autonomy. I conclude that the solution of Brandom and Pippin fails, but that a different reading of Hegel can solve the paradoxes of autonomy.
Mina Pavlović, University of Belgrade

Immanuel Kant’s Concept of Evil

In his work “Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone”, Immanuel Kant was the first to offer a purely secular theory of evil that does not refer to supernatural or divine entities. There, Kant intends to make sense of three conflicting truths about human nature. In this paper, I will attempt to clarify Kant’s view on moral evil. In the first part, I will explain what Kant had in mind when using the term “evil” and what is an evil person according to him. The second part of the paper will deal with the inconsistencies that arise from Kantian concepts of evil and morality.

Dušan Rebolj, University College London

Courage, norms, non-domination: how courage can still make us free(er)

Since the enlightenment political philosophers have been paying less attention to courage and emphasising other political virtues, like tolerance and civility – virtues more appropriate to the maintenance of diverse, and commerce-oriented communities. Since courage remains politically relevant, how should we approach it within contemporary political philosophy? Traditionally, courage has been considered crucial to achieving “freedom as non-domination”, which people enjoy when others cannot curb their choices at will. Freedom of this kind is ultimately secured by the existence of particular social norms. The paper explains how courage can help establish and maintain these freedom-securing norms.

Hedye Tayebi Jazayeri, University of Osnabrück

Debating Autonomy from a Feminist Perspective

In Western liberal societies, we tend to highly value the idea of being an autonomous person. A striving towards autonomy, typically associated with freedom, reason, and independence, guides us towards pursuing our authentic desires. But what desire is “authentic” if our attitudes and aspirations are socially shaped? This is where debates about different conceptions of autonomy come into play. Critiquing the common individualistic notions, many theorists seek to argue for a relational approach. That is, an understanding of autonomy that integrates global societal circumstances. As such perspectives are mainly advanced by feminist philosophers (e.g. Oshana, Friedman, Westlund, etc.), I will hereby focus on the literature on autonomy from a feminist perspective. Under constrained circumstances, what desires are healthy adaptations and what are self-undermining? The goal is to give an overview on current research and argue to advance our conception of autonomy in order to better develop necessary societal structures for women’s equity and dignity.
Anton Skretta, Northern Illinois University

Is Modal Personism a Mere Prejudice?

In “What’s Wrong with Speciesism?” Shelly Kagan argues that speciesism is not obviously a mere prejudice in the way that Peter Singer claims it is. Kagan proposes modal personism – an alternative to speciesism that accommodates our common moral intuitions. The modal personist holds that modal personhood – a property possessed by those who could have been persons – is a morally relevant property. My aim is to show that Kagan’s proposal is unsuccessful. Modal personism, like speciesism, depends on misleading, unreliable moral intuitions. Once we get clear about the source of these intuitions, we find that modal personism is a mere prejudice.

Martin Justin, University of Ljubljana

Environmental Ethics and the Identity Problem

Imagine a government can chose between two energy policies, one that is fossil fuels intensive and another that relies on green energy. The government predicts that the first will increase quality of life in the short run but cause significant environmental problems later while the second will decrease the quality now but won’t cause any future problems. They opt for the first policy. Moral philosophers go up in the air, saying the government is harming future generations. But a the government points out that since the decision will affect the way of life, the people who will be born under this policy would not have been born under another. So, nobody will get hurt. In intergenerational ethics, this is called the non-identity problem. In my paper, I will present a new objection to one of the ways of solving the problem. And then try to find the way out again.

Aisha Qadoos, University of Birmingham

Non-volitional transformative experiences

L.A. Paul describes personally transformative experiences as experiences that change what it’s like to be you and epistemically transformative experiences as those that give you knowledge that cannot be obtained without the experience (Paul, 2014; Paul, 2015). I argue that there are experiences such as those of a traumatic nature that are both personally and epistemically transformative but that are non-volitional. Such experiences have an additional element in that they are forced upon the agent i.e. they are not chosen unlike the experiences Paul describes. I argue that in addition to the changed self and new knowledge, the subject of non-volitional transformative experiences undergoes changes to her sense of agency that she must also reckon with.
Ilias Voiron, Jean-Moulin University Lyon and University of Fribourg

Individual Moral Duties in a World of Climate Injustices

In this paper, I will focus on the relationship between failed political duties of the state(s) and moral duties of the individuals in climate matters. First, I will argue that individuals ought to do something if their state fails to take action to prevent and/or rectify climate injustices. Second, I will argue that individual duties to combat climate injustices are a kind of individual duties to promote social justice. Third, I will nevertheless argue that individual climate duties are hard to specify, because in order to be valid they must fulfil some conditions.